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ABSTRACT 
We reexamine the recent, well-publicized claim that “rapid mass privatisation [of state-owned 
enterprises]…was a crucial determinant of differences in adult mortality trends in post-
communist countries” (Stuckler, King and McKee, 2009). Our analysis shows that the estimated 
correlation of privatization and mortality in country-level data is not robust to recomputing the 
mass-privatization measure, to assuming a short lag for economic policies to affect mortality, 
and to controlling for country-specific mortality trends. Further, in an analysis of the 
determinants of mortality in Russian regions, we find no evidence that privatization increased 
mortality during the early 1990s. Finally, we reanalyze the relationship between privatization and 
unemployment in postcommunist countries, showing that there is little support for the proposed 
mechanism by which privatization might have increased mortality. 
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1 Introduction
In the early 1990s, the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union initiated changes that would fundamentally transform their political and economic
institutions. Coincident with these changes, many countries in the region experienced a
dramatic increase in mortality, especially among working-age males. Various studies have
investigated this mortality spike, but debate continues on the underlying causal mechanisms.1
In a recent, well-publicized contribution to this literature, David Stuckler, Lawrence King,
and Martin McKee (henceforth SKM) argue in The Lancet that “rapid mass privatisation [of
state-owned enterprises]. . . was a crucial determinant of diﬀerences in adult mortality trends
in post-communist countries” (Stuckler, King and McKee, 2009, p. 1).2 The evidence oﬀered
in support of this claim consists of country-level regressions of the adult male mortality rate
on measures of enterprise privatization. The authors’ primary interpretation is that rapid
privatization increased unemployment and consequently illness, for which they oﬀer support
from country-level analysis of unemployment. The estimated eﬀects of mass privatization
on both mortality and unemployment are reported to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant
only in the former Soviet Union; no evident eﬀects are reported among Central and East
European countries.
The publication of SKM’s study has reignited debate over the eﬀects of economic reform. The
provocative tone of the Economist leader on the topic—“Mass Murder and the Market”—
reﬂects the stakes involved: should reformers be held responsible for millions of premature
deaths?3 Jeﬀrey Sachs, an architect of “shock therapy” in postcommunist countries, sug-
gests that the study is a “confused polemic that will not withstand serious epidemiologi-
cal scrutiny.”4 On the other side, Joseph Stiglitz argues that “[The] Lancet is right that
Poland was an example of more gradual policies”—the study credits gradualism with re-
duced mortality—and reasserts his view that “‘shock therapy’ was a disastrous economic
policy.”5
Did mass privatization increase mortality in postcommunist countries? In this paper, we re-
examine this relationship. We ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀect of privatization in cross-country
data is not robust to recomputing the mass privatization measure using original source data,
to assuming short lags between economic policies and changes in mortality rates, and to
controlling for country-speciﬁc mortality trends. We also examine the relationship between
privatization and mortality across Russian regions, ﬁnding no evidence that privatization
was responsible for the large increase in Russian mortality during the early 1990s. Finally,
we reanalyze the relationship between privatization and unemployment. Counter to the
1Cornia and Paniccia` (2000), Shkolnikov et al. (2004), and Stillman (2006) provide extensive reviews.
Recent studies that investigate the impact of particular policies and societal characteristics include Brainerd
and Cutler (2005), Bobak et al. (2007), Treisman (2008), and Denisova (2009).
2All page numbers refer to the online version of SKM.
3“Mass Murder and the Market,” Economist, January 22, 2009.
4“‘Shock Therapy’ Had No Adverse Eﬀect on Life Expectancy in Eastern Europe,” Jeﬀrey D. Sachs,
letter to the Financial Times published January 19, 2009.
5“Stiglitz on Death and Privatization in the Eastern Bloc,” New York Times Economix blog, January
16, 2009.
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claims of SKM, there is no robust evidence that privatization increased unemployment in
postcommunist countries.
2 Cross-Country Analysis
The results in SKM raise a number of questions concerning sample, data, deﬁnitions, and
methods: Are the measures of privatization appropriate? Are any eﬀects of privatization
on mortality instantaneous? Are there no pre-existing trends in the data? How much can
one conclude from a sample of only 15 countries (the FSU sample), and is country the
right level of analysis? More generally, is the privatization coeﬃcient identiﬁed, statistically
distinguishable from other factors that may have aﬀected mortality? And what is the causal
mechanism that might link mortality with privatization? We address these questions through
a series of related research designs.
We begin by reexamining the cross-country correlation between mortality and privatization.
The evidence put forward by SKM is based on an unbalanced panel of 24 countries observed
annually from 1989 to 2002, but a positive impact of privatization on mortality is estimated
only for the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union (FSU), not for the 9 countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). We therefore focus attention on the former group; results for
CEE are available in Table A1 in the Appendix.
We ﬁrst perform pure replications using the SKM regression speciﬁcations. The dependent
variable in SKM and our replications is the natural log of the age-standardized mortality
rate for males aged 15–59. SKM use two alternative measures of privatization in diﬀerent
speciﬁcations: a “mass privatization” indicator and the “average EBRD privatization index,”
the latter the average of two widely used measures of progress in privatization published in
the annual Transition Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(e.g., EBRD, 2007). We discuss both measures further below. In all speciﬁcations, SKM
include country ﬁxed eﬀects, and they control for various time-varying country characteris-
tics: log income, price liberalization, foreign exchange/trade liberalization, democracy, war,
population dependency, urbanization, and higher education.
Columns (1) and (2) of the ﬁrst row of estimates in Table 1 present these replications. The
results are very similar to those published in SKM. There is a positive estimated impact of
privatization using both measures in the FSU sample. As in SKM, the estimated impact is
zero in CEE (as shown in Table A1). Results for the control variables are not reported in
SKM, so we suppress them here as well (they are available on request).
We next use original source data to reexamine the SKM privatization variables. (With
the exception of these variables, we continue to use the SKM data in all speciﬁcations.)
Beginning with the mass privatization indicator, the SKM deﬁnition is “a programme that
transferred the ownership of at least 25% of large state-owned enterprises to the private
sector in 2 years. . . 0 before mass privatisation, 1 thereafter,” measured as “a jump from 1
to 3 on the EBRD large-scale privatisation index” (p. 2). The coding of the SKM variable is
sometimes inconsistent with this deﬁnition, however, as when the rise from 1 to 3 took more
than two years but the SKM variable is coded as 1. Furthermore, the SKM description of
timing is ambiguous: at what point during the period the EBRD index is changing should
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the indicator change from 0 to 1? The SKM variable is again inconsistent, but it seems most
reasonable to code the mass privatization indicator as 1 from the year the index reaches
3. We use a recoded indicator that incorporates these two changes; details are available in
Tables A2–A4.
Results for a regression with the recoded mass-privatization indicator are shown in column (3)
of the ﬁrst row of Table 1. The estimated eﬀect on mortality is much smaller and only weakly
signiﬁcant. Further, as Table A1 shows, the estimated eﬀect of privatization on mortality is
now large and negative in Central and Eastern Europe. These results greatly undermine the
case that enterprise privatization raised mortality in postcommunist countries. Giving SKM
the beneﬁt of the doubt, one could point out that designations of “mass privatization” are
subjective, possibly diﬀering among knowledgeable observers. SKM’s description of their
indicator might be incorrect or oversimpliﬁed. In any case, the results are clearly quite
sensitive to the coding of this variable.
We also use original source data to disaggregate the other SKM measure, the average EBRD
privatization index, into its large-scale and small-scale components. The former refers to
large industrial enterprises and the latter to small establishments in trade and services, farms,
land, and housing. Yet all the article’s arguments refer to large ﬁrms: for instance, “[t]he
results would be more severe for employees of large-scale capital-intensive heavy industry
and manufacturing enterprises. . . ” (p. 2). The SKM emphasis on large privatization is
also implicit in the use of only the EBRD large privatization index to construct the mass
privatization indicator.
Replacing the SKM average with the large and small indices in separate regressions produces
the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1. Interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcient on
each component is smaller than the coeﬃcient on their average. Moreover, the estimated
coeﬃcient on small privatization is larger than that on large privatization, suggesting that
both variables may be picking up some other aspect of transition that is associated with
mortality.
Finally, we consider issues of regression speciﬁcation. Many questions could be raised about
the SKM speciﬁcation, but we restrict attention to two: timing and trends. First, SKM
assume that the impact of privatization on mortality is immediate, but it seems more likely
that any impact would occur with a lag. Certainly this is the case if the causal mechanism
is the one adduced in the article: privatized ﬁrms shed workers, who in turn become unem-
ployed and unhealthy. Second, the SKM speciﬁcation also assumes that trends in mortality
are equal for all countries. As Figure 1 illustrates, however, adult male mortality trends are
quite diﬀerent across these countries.6 Indeed, male mortality in most of the Soviet republics
declined in the early 1980s, reaching a minimum around 1986–1987, and then began a steep
rise, accelerating in some cases in the early 1990s, then declining and reverting to the post-
6The adult mortality data in the ﬁgure are drawn from the World Health Organization (2008), as they
are available for a longer time period than the Unicef data used in SKM and the rest of this paper. We use
the world standard population to weight mortality rates for ages 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, and 45–54. Thus, the
age range is slightly diﬀerent from the Unicef data, which include males up to age 59. But both the levels
and trends in the data are very similar across the two sources for the years in which they are available in
both.
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1986 trend by the mid-1990s. The SKM comparison of mortality rates before and after mass
privatization reﬂects these trends, which began well before the fall of communism (see also
Stillman, 2006) and are statistically signiﬁcant even within the SKM sample of years.7 Given
these questions about timing and trends, we therefore check the robustness of the results to
lagging the privatization and other economic variables and to inclusion of country-speciﬁc
linear time trends.
The speciﬁcations in the second and third rows of Table 1 lag the privatization and other
economic variables by one and two years, respectively. Lagging by just one year substantially
attenuates the original estimates and reduces their statistical signiﬁcance. Lagging by two
years further reduces the estimated coeﬃcients and in four of ﬁve cases eliminates their
statistical signiﬁcance entirely. As shown in Table A1, with two-year lags three of the
ﬁve CEE coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, but negative, implying that privatization
lowered rather than raised mortality rates in these countries.8
The speciﬁcation in the fourth row of Table 1 adds country-speciﬁc linear time trends. This
small change substantially reduces both the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the
estimated eﬀect of privatization on mortality. Combining country-speciﬁc trends with one-
year lags (the ﬁfth row of Table 1) eliminates any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of privatization
on mortality. Combining trends and two-year lags (the sixth row of Table 1) results in only
negative coeﬃcients, three of them statistically signiﬁcant.
While the correct functional form for the privatization-mortality relationship is unknown,
these results show that small, reasonable changes in variable measurement or speciﬁcation
yield substantially diﬀerent conclusions on the magnitude and even sign of this relationship.
We conclude that the positive estimated eﬀect of privatization on mortality reported in SKM
is not robust.
3 Privatization and Mortality in Russian Regions
We next turn to an alternative research design, examining the relationship between privati-
zation and mortality across regions within Russia, perhaps the country with the best-known
privatization program. This within-country approach has the advantage of holding constant
many features of the economic, political, and social environment that could be correlated
with privatization and mortality.9 At the same time, we can exploit substantial variation
across regions in the extent of privatization and in changes in mortality rates during the
early transition period.
7An F -test on country-speciﬁc trends in a regression using data through 1993—the pre-privatization years
in the data—produces a statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.02 level. For an early suggestion that the results in
SKM might not be robust to controlling for trends, see “Smertnost’ v Rossii skvoz’ prizmu privatizatsii,”
Demoskop Weekly, February 2–15, 2009.
8The tables report results from speciﬁcations that drop the ﬁrst one and two observations for each country,
respectively, when lagging by one and two years, but the estimates are very similar if we instead use original
source data to back-ﬁll variables.
9Ivaschenko (2005), Treisman (2008), and Walberg et al. (2009) employ a similar research design in
investigations of mortality in Russian regions, but none explore the impact of privatization.
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The Russian State Statistics Service (Rosstat) provides regional data on mortality. Unfortu-
nately, however, the mortality rate for working-age men (deﬁned as deaths per 100,000 men
aged 16 to 60), the focus of SKM and most work on mortality in postcommunist countries,
is not available for the years 1991–1993. Given that mass privatization in Russia was im-
plemented between late 1992 and mid-1994, we therefore examine determinants of change in
(the log of) the mortality rate for working-age men from 1990 to 1995, regressing this vari-
able on measures of privatization and other regional characteristics; we obtain qualitatively
similar results if we use the change from 1990 to 1994. We also consider changes in mortality
rates for six major causes of death: infectious diseases; cancer; diseases of the circulatory,
respiratory, and digestive systems, respectively; and “external” causes of death, including
accidents, homicides, and suicides. Finally, as a check on these results, we estimate panel
models where the dependent variable is (the log of) the mortality rate for the general popu-
lation, which is available for all years during the period of interest. The pairwise correlation
between change in mortality for working-age men and change in mortality for the general
population is 0.88.
Figure 2 depicts change in mortality rates for working-age men from 1990 to 1995. Mortality
rates increased in every region in Russia during this period. Dagestan experienced the
smallest change, with an increase in mortality from 479 deaths per 100,000 working-age
males in 1990 to 550 in 1995. The largest change was recorded in Sakhalin, where mortality
increased from 758 deaths per 100,000 working-age males in 1990 to 1,729 in 1995. Many
of the regions with the largest increases are concentrated in the northern part of European
Russia, a historically more developed and urbanized area of the country.
To examine the relationship between privatization and change in mortality, we use two
measures of employment in privatized ﬁrms. The ﬁrst, provided by Rosstat, is the proportion
of employment in ﬁrms with mixed state-private ownership. Because the state retained a
residual share in nearly every ﬁrm privatized through mass privatization, this corresponds
closely to privatized employment. (In contrast, fully private ﬁrms are in most cases de novo
enterprises.) For our cross-section regressions, where the dependent variable is change in
mortality from 1990 to 1995, we use data from 1995, the ﬁrst year available.
We constructed the second measure, privatized manufacturing employment, from industrial-
registry data on manufacturing enterprises collected by Rosstat and used in Brown, Earle and
Gehlbach (2009) to estimate regional productivity eﬀects of privatization. As summarized
in that paper, these data are quite comprehensive, corresponding roughly to the “old” sector
of manufacturing ﬁrms (and their successors) inherited from the Soviet system. For our
cross-section regressions, we use ownership and employment data from 1994 to calculate the
proportion of manufacturing employment in ﬁrms privatized to domestic owners. Both this
and the Rosstat measure exhibit substantial variation, with standard deviations of 13% and
7%, respectively, versus means of 81% and 22%. Figure 3 depicts the geographic distribution
of the ﬁrst of the two measures.
In our cross-section analysis, we control for various regional characteristics that may be cor-
related with both changes in mortality and privatization outcomes. In addition to regressors
similar to those in SKM, proportion Muslim (Heleniak, 2006) is included because regions
with large Muslim populations may have been less aﬀected by changes in the price and avail-
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ability of alcohol, a leading explanation for changes in mortality rates (Leon et al., 1997;
Brainerd and Cutler, 2005; Leon et al., 2007; Treisman, 2008; Zaridze et al., 2009). Mean
January temperature is also included, as conditions may be diﬀerent in inhospitable regions
populated forcibly during the Stalinist era.
Table 2 reports results from OLS regressions of initial mortality and change in mortality on
various regional characteristics, including our two privatization measures. For purposes of
this paper, the primary ﬁnding is the uniform absence of any evidence that privatization
increased mortality for working-age men. The point estimate of the privatization eﬀect is in
fact negative in every case, and it is statistically signiﬁcant when privatization is deﬁned as
privatized manufacturing employment. This holds regardless of whether initial mortality is
included among the regressors.
Table 3 presents regressions of the change in mortality rate by cause of death on our two
privatization measures and the same regional characteristics used in columns (2) and (4)
of Table 2; we obtain similar results from regressions where initial mortality is included as
a regressor. Out of twelve regressions, the estimated eﬀect of privatization on mortality is
positive and close to signiﬁcant at conventional levels (p = 0.101) only when the dependent
variable is change in mortality from cancer and privatization is measured as privatized man-
ufacturing employment. (When initial mortality is included as a regressor, the estimated
coeﬃcient on privatized manufacturing employment is 0.138, signiﬁcant at p = 0.053.) Be-
cause cancer rates are unlikely to be aﬀected in the short term by economic dislocation,
any eﬀect of privatization would more likely act through the withdrawal of medical care for
cancer patients (e.g., if clinics had fewer resources for cancer treatment in regions with high
privatization rates) than through increased risk of cancer. That said, there is no evidence of
such an eﬀect for other diseases, and variation in change in cancer mortality rates accounts
for little of the variation in change in overall mortality rates.10
As a ﬁnal exercise, we regress log mortality for the general population on various time-varying
regional characteristics for a balanced panel covering the years 1991–2002.11 Because we are
interested in the impact of privatization on mortality, and not the share of employment in
privatized ﬁrms per se (which may decrease over time as privatized ﬁrms downsize and new
ﬁrms enter the market), we deﬁne our privatization variables to take values from the ﬁnal
year of mass privatization in all subsequent years. This practice is analogous to that in the
cross-country regressions reported in SKM and above. We include region ﬁxed eﬀects in all
regressions.
Table 4 reports results from these panel regressions. In a baseline speciﬁcation similar to that
in SKM, the estimated eﬀect of privatization on mortality is positive for both privatization
variables. However, as with the alternative cross-country speciﬁcations reported in Table
1, the estimated impact of privatization is attenuated when the economic variables (here,
privatization and income) are lagged one year, and the point estimate reverses sign when
10Notzon et al. (1998) report that more than half the decline in Russian life expectancy in Russia during
the 1990s can be attributed to cardiovascular diseases and external causes of death.
11Some variables used above are available only as a cross section; others are unavailable for 1990. Our
qualitative results are very similar if we control for the regional vodka price, as in Treisman (2008); that
variable is available from 1992.
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these variables are lagged two years. Moreover, in four out of six speciﬁcations, the estimated
eﬀect of privatization is smaller (more negative) when region-speciﬁc trends are added to the
equation. As with the cross-country results reported in the previous section, we conclude
that the positive estimated correlation between privatization and mortality is not robust.
4 Privatization and Unemployment
The analysis so far focuses on the robustness—or lack thereof—of the privatization-mortality
correlation in SKM. As a ﬁnal check on the results, we consider the question of causality: how
could privatization raise mortality? The main theory oﬀered by SKM is that privatized ﬁrms
reduce employment, with the resulting unemployment leading to worsened health and higher
mortality. But is the ﬁrst step in this logic valid—that is, does privatization systematically
lead to substantial job loss?
SKM provide evidence on this point from regressions of the log of the registered male unem-
ployment level on the same set of variables used in the mortality regressions. The reported
coeﬃcients on the mass privatization indicator and EBRD average privatization index are
positive in the FSU, but not in CEE. We replicate that analysis, again checking for robustness
to speciﬁcations that account for timing and trends.
The ﬁrst two columns of the ﬁrst row of Table 5 are pure replications of the SKM unem-
ployment results, and the estimates are qualitatively similar. The results to the right in
this row, however, show that the estimated eﬀect of the recoded mass privatization indicator
is negative, though statistically insigniﬁcant, and the average EBRD eﬀect is due entirely
to the small privatization index. The estimated large privatization eﬀect is much smaller
and statistically insigniﬁcant, which is entirely incompatible with the argument in SKM
that “[t]he results would be more severe for employees of large-scale capital-intensive heavy
industry and manufacturing enterprises. . . ” (p. 2). Indeed, the retail and services sectors
aﬀected by small privatization were neglected under central planning and thus much more
likely to grow after privatization. These results most likely reﬂect the coincidence of small
privatization with the collapse of socialism and consequent rise of open unemployment in
early transition.
The second row of Table 5 lags privatization and other economic variables by one year, which
permits time for policy implementation to aﬀect downsizing; the estimated eﬀect of priva-
tization on unemployment is substantially smaller than that in the baseline speciﬁcation in
all ﬁve cases. Adding country-speciﬁc trends to account for diﬀerences in trend unemploy-
ment growth, the estimated coeﬃcients are all statistically insigniﬁcant, with magnitudes
generally close to zero.
These results refer to country-level correlations, as in SKM. Analyses of such aggregated
data always face problems from confounding inﬂuences, but there is a substantial body of
relevant research that uses micro-level data with direct observations on ﬁrms with long time
series before and after privatization. Perhaps the clearest example of such research is Brown,
Earle and Telegdy (2009, henceforth BET), which analyzes data on nearly every manufac-
turing ﬁrm inherited from the socialist period in four major transition economies: Hungary,
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. While the data have the disadvantage of not covering all
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the countries of the FSU and CEE, an important advantage is the possibility to directly
observe ownership, employment, and other variables at the ﬁrm level. Firms are followed
for up to 20 years, enabling BET to follow the path of employment and other variables for
long periods both before and after privatization. The data also contain state-owned ﬁrms
that are never privatized, which together with those that are not yet but eventually will be
privatized can form a control group in examining the eﬀect of privatization on employment
within a particular industry and year. This ability to compare ﬁrms within industries and
years—apples with apples, rather than apples with oranges—is a clear beneﬁt of analyzing
data at the level of the decision-maker rather than in the aggregate.
Analyzing these data with several statistical methods to control for possible biases due to
selection of ﬁrms for privatization, BET ﬁnd no evidence that privatization systematically
lowers ﬁrm-level employment. As shown in Figure 4, the estimated eﬀects of privatiza-
tion to domestic owners are generally tiny, and where they are negative the magnitudes
are almost always statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimated eﬀects of foreign
privatization are almost always positive, large, and statistically signiﬁcant, generally imply-
ing an approximate 10% expansion of employment following the foreign acquisition. The
estimated foreign-privatization eﬀect in Romania is the largest negative value, but it is sta-
tistically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In Russia, the country with the most well-known
mass privatization, the domestic privatization eﬀect is positive. Analysis of the long time
series in the data shows that the absence of negative employment eﬀects of privatization
is the consequence neither of delayed restructuring several years after privatization nor of
pre-privatization downsizing, which is negligible in these economies.
These empirical results strongly contradict the notion, frequently assumed but little investi-
gated, that large job cuts follow privatization. Why is this assumption empirically incorrect?
One possibility is that privatization simply matters very little for ﬁrm behavior: new private
owners do not restructure and therefore do not lay oﬀ workers. BET investigate this possibil-
ity by decomposing the employment eﬀects of privatization into two components, which we
label “productivity” and “scale” eﬀects. Holding the ﬁrm’s scale—its level of production—
constant, an increase in productivity tends to lower employment. Holding constant the
level of productivity, an increase in scale tends to raise it. The empirical analysis of these
mechanisms ﬁnds that privatization tends to raise both productivity and scale; results are
displayed in Figure 4. Both eﬀects are much larger in ﬁrms privatized to foreign investors,
with 10–25% increases in productivity and 15–30% increases in scale. The dominance of the
scale over the productivity eﬀect implies the positive impact of privatization on employment
that we observe.
Privatization to new domestic owners in Hungary and Romania also yields positive produc-
tivity and scale eﬀects, but they are smaller (6–10%) than the corresponding foreign eﬀects,
and the productivity eﬀects slightly dominate the scale eﬀects, resulting in very small neg-
ative impacts of privatization on employment in these cases. The productivity and scale
eﬀects of domestic privatization are tiny in Ukraine. Domestic privatization in Russia is the
outlier, with more substantial negative estimated eﬀects on both productivity and scale, but
the drop in productivity exceeds the fall in scale, resulting in a positive net employment
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impact.12
Thus, the primary mechanism hypothesized in SKM is also not supported by analysis of
data on ﬁrms, the level where decisions about employment and privatization take place.
Unemployment may worsen health, but there is little evidence that postcommunist privati-
zation caused unemployment to rise. Moreover, while involuntary turnover of workers may
lead to poor health outcomes,13 all available evidence suggests little impact of enterprise
privatization in postcommunist societies on layoﬀs and other types of worker turnover.14
5 Conclusion
Did mass privatization increase mortality in postcommunist countries? A casual reader of
the world’s newspapers in January 2009 might be inclined to think so, as many international
outlets reported the results of a Lancet study that claimed to ﬁnd such an eﬀect.15 While the
study is useful in drawing renewed attention to an important question, closer scrutiny shows
that the data do not support the assertion that privatization was a “crucial determinant” of
mortality in postcommunist countries. The correlations reported in the original article are
simply not robust.
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Table 1: Cross-Country Mortality Regressions on the SKM Sample of FSU Countries
Mass Average EBRD Recoded Mass EBRD Large EBRD Small
Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SKM speciﬁcation 0.158∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.022) (0.040) (0.016) (0.023)
One-year lags 0.108∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.015 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.041) (0.023) (0.038) (0.017) (0.023)
Two-year lags 0.063∗ 0.014 −0.015 0.031 −0.006
(0.037) (0.025) (0.043) (0.023) (0.021)
Country-speciﬁc trends 0.093∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.050 0.035 0.054∗
(0.038) (0.031) (0.048) (0.024) (0.029)
One-year lags & country-speciﬁc trends 0.034 0.036 −0.014 0.017 0.029
(0.041) (0.030) (0.055) (0.022) (0.029)
Two-year lags & country-speciﬁc trends −0.042 −0.047∗ −0.113∗∗ −0.006 −0.053∗∗
(0.034) (0.028) (0.056) (0.024) (0.024)
Notes: Each cell of the table reports the estimated eﬀect of privatization on log working-age male mortality rate from a separate regression. Sample
is 15 countries of the former Soviet Union, 177 country-years. With the exception of the privatization measures in Column (3)–(5), data are identical
to those in SKM. Speciﬁcations are identical but for the speciﬁc changes noted in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, *= 0.10.
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Figure 1: Mortality Trends in Former Soviet Union
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Figure 2: Change in Log Mortality Rate for Working-Age Males, 1990–1995
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Figure 3: Share of Employment in Privatized Firms, 1995
15
Table 2: Determinants of Mortality in Russian Regions
Initial
mortality Change in Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Privatized employment −0.130 −0.136
(0.169) (0.169)
Privatized manufacturing employment −0.188∗ −0.189∗
(0.099) (0.104)
Log initial mortality −0.035 0.012
(0.140) (0.140)
Log income −0.058 0.004 0.002 −0.003 −0.002
(0.065) (0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
Population dependency 1.821∗∗ −1.570∗∗ −1.504∗ −1.704∗∗ −1.726∗∗
(0.798) (0.776) (0.793) (0.764) (0.812)
Urbanization −0.080 0.639∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.128) (0.130) (0.086) (0.082)
Higher education −0.179 −0.859 −0.870 −1.006∗ −1.006∗
(0.276) (0.599) (0.616) (0.558) (0.563)
Proportion Muslim −0.586∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.12 −0.133∗∗∗−0.126
(0.085) (0.045) (0.085) (0.046) (0.080)
Mean January temperature −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 5.900∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗ 1.031 1.041∗∗∗ 0.973
(0.364) (0.349) (0.921) (0.365) (0.875)
R-squared 0.569 0.628 0.628 0.647 0.647
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variable is log mortality rate for working-age men, 1990 (column
1); change in log mortality rate for working-age men, 1990 to 1995 (columns 2–5). Sample is 76
regions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01,
** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
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Table 3: Determinants of Mortality in Russian Regions by Cause of Death
Panel A: Privatized employment
Infectious Circulatory Respiratory Digestive External
diseases Cancer system system system causes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized employment −0.872∗∗ 0.040 0.133 −0.506 −0.051 −0.511∗
(0.380) (0.182) (0.210) (0.521) (0.519) (0.295)
Log income 0.000 0.125∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ −0.419∗ 0.047 −0.032
(0.244) (0.060) (0.059) (0.247) (0.282) (0.133)
Population dependency −0.127 −1.301∗ −0.920 −6.483∗∗∗ 0.646 −0.466
(1.468) (0.766) (0.764) (1.711) (1.955) (1.397)
Urbanization 1.102∗∗ −0.081 0.295∗∗ 1.618∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.097) (0.119) (0.424) (0.521) (0.226)
Higher education −1.366 −0.426 −0.587 −0.905 −0.981 −1.383
(1.129) (0.326) (0.358) (1.409) (1.235) (1.213)
Proportion Muslim 0.059 −0.018 −0.048 −0.269∗ −0.185 −0.168
(0.211) (0.099) (0.058) (0.148) (0.208) (0.127)
Mean January temperature −0.011 0.000 −0.002 −0.010∗ −0.003 −0.003
(0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.238 0.745∗∗ 0.823∗∗ 2.124∗∗ −0.124 0.113
(0.675) (0.372) (0.346) (0.806) (0.862) (0.686)
R-squared 0.233 0.333 0.514 0.641 0.236 0.452
Panel B: Privatized manufacturing employment
Infectious Circulatory Respiratory Digestive External
diseases Cancer system system system causes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized manufacturing −0.073 0.115 −0.019 −0.018 0.001 −0.287∗∗
employment (0.446) (0.069) (0.103) (0.238) (0.271) (0.114)
Log income 0.032 0.131∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ −0.399 0.049 −0.029
(0.268) (0.060) (0.062) (0.244) (0.285) (0.133)
Population dependency −0.356 −1.229 −0.902 −6.603∗∗∗ 0.636 −0.737
(1.591) (0.771) (0.790) (1.719) (1.902) (1.366)
Urbanization 0.764∗∗ −0.098 0.355∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.074) (0.095) (0.336) (0.431) (0.161)
Higher education −0.734 −0.303 −0.725∗∗ −0.505 −0.937 −1.346
(0.912) (0.281) (0.317) (1.257) (1.153) (1.128)
Proportion Muslim 0.040 0.002 −0.050 −0.275 −0.185 −0.222∗
(0.256) (0.091) (0.065) (0.171) (0.228) (0.122)
Mean January temperature −0.009 −0.001 −0.003 −0.009∗ −0.003 0.000
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.423 0.616 0.828∗∗ 2.205∗∗ −0.119 0.485
(0.835) (0.382) (0.379) (0.850) (0.875) (0.698)
R-squared 0.202 0.351 0.512 0.636 0.236 0.456
Notes: Dependent variable is change in log mortality rate for working-age men, 1990 to 1995, by cause of
death. Sample is 76 regions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
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Table 4: Determinants of Mortality in Russian Regions: Panel Regressions
Panel A: Privatized employment
One-year Two-year Region-speciﬁc 1-year lags 2-year lags
Baseline lags lags trends & trends & trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized employment 0.612∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.030) (0.027) (0.072) (0.058) (0.048)
Log income −0.071∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Population dependency −2.671∗∗∗ −3.101∗∗∗ −3.246∗∗∗ −1.967∗∗∗ −1.218∗∗ −1.910∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.218) (0.245) (0.594) (0.537) (0.573)
Urbanization −0.523 0.037 0.346 −1.992∗∗∗ −0.472 −0.280
(0.334) (0.301) (0.375) (0.388) (0.422) (0.504)
Panel B: Privatized manufacturing employment
One-year Two-year Region-speciﬁc 1-year lags 2-year lags
Baseline lags lags trends & trends & trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized manufacturing 0.228∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
employment (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
Log income −0.052∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Population dependency −2.373∗∗∗ −2.777∗∗∗ −3.265∗∗∗ −4.855∗∗∗ −3.755∗∗∗ −1.397∗∗
(0.201) (0.209) (0.230) (0.636) (0.645) (0.590)
Urbanization 0.057 0.152 0.371 −0.978∗∗∗ −0.396 −0.413
(0.304) (0.295) (0.368) (0.332) (0.367) (0.499)
Notes: Dependent variable is log mortality rate for general population. Sample is a balanced panel of 76
regions, 1991–2002. Region ﬁxed eﬀects (all columns) and region-speciﬁc trends (columns 4–6) included.
Privatized (manufacturing) employment and log income lagged, as indicated. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
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Table 5: Cross-Country Unemployment Regressions on the SKM Sample of FSU Countries
Mass Average EBRD Recoded Mass EBRD Large EBRD Small
Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SKM speciﬁcation 0.684∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ −0.073 0.203 0.594∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.158) (0.255) (0.127) (0.138)
One-year lag 0.568∗∗∗ 0.272∗ −0.371 0.116 0.282∗∗
(0.211) (0.142) (0.234) (0.117) (0.112)
One-year lag & country-speciﬁc trends 0.300 0.080 −0.340 0.017 0.082
(0.213) (0.153) (0.239) (0.127) (0.112)
Notes: Each cell of the table reports the estimated eﬀect of privatization on log registered male unemployment level from a separate regression.
Sample is 15 countries of the former Soviet Union, 177 country-years. With the exception of the privatization measures in Column (3)–(5), data are
identical to those in SKM. Speciﬁcations are identical but for the speciﬁc changes noted in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, *= 0.10.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the Employment Eﬀect of Privatization into Scale and Productivity Eﬀects (Esti-
mates with Firm-Speciﬁc Trends)
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Table A1: Cross-Country Mortality Regressions on the SKM Sample of CEE Countries
Mass Average EBRD Recoded Mass EBRD Large EBRD Small
Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SKM speciﬁcation −0.005 −0.019 −0.140∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.005
(0.042) (0.018) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016)
One-year lags −0.046 −0.028∗ −0.082∗ −0.022∗ −0.021∗
(0.040) (0.014) (0.044) (0.013) (0.012)
Two-year lags −0.060∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.053 −0.017 −0.032∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) (0.009)
Country-speciﬁc trends −0.022 −0.024 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.003
(0.033) (0.022) (0.030) (0.014) (0.017)
One-year lags & country-speciﬁc trends −0.053 −0.033∗∗ −0.056 −0.019 −0.019
(0.036) (0.016) (0.048) (0.013) (0.012)
Two-year lags & country-speciﬁc trends −0.038 −0.033∗∗ −0.023 −0.009 −0.031∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.014) (0.036) (0.010) (0.011)
Notes: Each cell of the table reports the estimated eﬀect of privatization on log working-age male mortality rate from a separate regression. Sample is
9 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 112 country-years. With the exception of the privatization measures in Column (3)–(5), data are identical
to those in SKM. Speciﬁcations are identical but for the speciﬁc changes noted in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, *= 0.10.
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Table A2: Mass Privatization Indicator: Coding in SKM
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Armenia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latvia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moldova 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Russia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A3: Mass Privatization Indicator: Recoding Using Data from Original Source with Correction for Timing
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Russia 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A4: EBRD Large Privatization Index
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Albania 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.67 2.67 3 3
Armenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.33
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1.67 1.67 2 2
Belarus 1 1 1 1 1.67 1.67 1.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1.67 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3.67 3.67 3.67
Croatia 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Czech Republic 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Estonia 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33
Hungary 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Latvia 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.33
Lithuania 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.33 3.67
Macedonia 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Moldova 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Poland 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33
Romania 1 1 1.67 1.67 2 2 2 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 3 3.33 3.33
Russia 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33
Slovakia 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33
Turkmenistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.67 1.67 1.67 1 1
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.67 3 3
Uzbekistan 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators (http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/tic.xls).
24
